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"Physical value" is a term frequently used by. the expert as a
synonym for "cost of reproduction less depreciation." To the unso-
phisticated, however, the term implies the rock-bottom sum on which
a utility should be allowed to earn a fair return; it seems to den6te a
fundamental fact; a reduction of rates to the pqint where they yield
a fair return on this quantity seems to squeeze out ruthlessly what-
ever "water" there may be in the property. To reduce them further
is thought to be not only unconstitutional, but unthinkable-it is to
fly in the face of some "physical" law as immutable as the law of
gravitation (in pre-Einstein days).'- Yet ,this sanctjty and certainty
of the "physical value" theory of rates, it is submittedi is the result of
loose reasoning, and serves merely to divert the time, attention, and
funds of regulating bodies out of their proper'channels into one of the
most unreal fields of speculation in which the minds of metaphysicians
have disported themselves since the days of the medieval schoolmen.
The reproduction cost theory is a survival from an earlier doctrine
which turned out to involve an obvious logical fallacy. Whether
or not the modified theory avoids the fallacy, it certainly avoids the
reason which led to the adoption of its predecessor. It has been
bolstered up after the fact, however, by a number of other arguments,
each one of which, on. close examination, turns out to possess merit
rather for its- faith in the courts than for its works in the realm of
reason.
THE EARLIER VALUATION DOCTRINE AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
To comprehend the hold which the doctrine has obtained, we must
examine, its history. Fearing that the legislative power to regulate, as
'George McAneny, for.instance, is reported to have said at a hearing before
Governor Miller on the New York Transit Bill, "The fact is that the utilities
can get nothing, more out of this plan than they get today, with the single excep-
tion, possibly, of the bankrupt surface lines which, however, could get nothing
more than the sum that represents the interest upon the appraisal of theirphysical values." New York Times, March 3o, 1921. Governor Miller himself,
however, does not seem to understand "physical value" in the Transit Act to
be synonymous with cost of reproduction less depreciation, which he says
"would undoubtedly be unjust to the public at the present time." This was in
a letter of March 31, 1921, to F rederick L. Cranford, Chairman of the Transit
Committee.of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, reported in the New York
Times, April 1, 1921. The "physical value" referred to is to be estimated,
under the Act, for the purpose, in part at least, of determining the compensa-
tion to be paid by the city for acquiring the lines.
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enunciated in Munn v. Illinois,2 might lead to a destruction of property
rights,8 the United States Supreme Court attempted to limit the exer-
cise of the power to cases where confiscation would not- result."
Confiscation consisted, at least in Justice Brewer's mind, in taking the
use of the property for rates less than the market value of that use,'
or in destroying the value of the property itself.6 In the former sense,
however, no legislature can ever reduce a rate without confiscation, or
else the statement is nugatory. It must be obvious that the market
value of the service is whatever price is charged by the company,
provided only that there are some buyers at that price, and that all who
care to buy at that price may do, so. The market value of a subway
ticket in New York is, at this writing, 5 cts. Should the new Transit
Commission authorize a charge of 8 cts, the market value will be 8 cts.
Should there be a subsequent reduction to 7.cts, that reduction would
constitute a "taking" of the service rendered by the subway to each
passenger, for a compensation less than the market value of that
service, as it was previous to the "condemnation." Any reduction,
under any circumstances, would be confiscatory. If "confiscation" is
defined as taking the service for a passenger at a compensation less
than the value of the service after the regulation and at the time when
the passenger takes it, then no reduction could possibly be confiscatory.
Were the fare to be reduced to i ct, since i ct would be. the new value
of the service, the passenger would be making full conipensation
1 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
"'This power to regulate is not a power to destroy," said Chief Justice Waite
in Stone v. Farmer.? Loan & Trust *Co. (1886) x16 U. S. 307, 33I, 6 Sup. Ct.
334, 345.
'The history of the Supreme Court's wanderings and hesitations on this
subject is admirably set forth in two articles by Gerard C. Henderson, entitled
Railway Valuation and the Courts (1920) 33 H v, L, RE. 902, io3i.'
'In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 410, 14 Sup.
Ct. 1o47, 1059, Justice Brewer said: "If the state were to seek to acquire the
title to these -roads, under its power of eminent domain, is there any doubt that
constitutional provisions would require the payment to the corporation of just
compensation.,-that compensation being -the value of the property as it stood
in the markets of the world, and not as prescribed by an act of the legislature?
Is it any less a departure from the obligations of justice to seek to take, not
the title, but the use for the public benefit, at less than its market value?"
' Sitting as a Circuit Judge in Ames v. Union Pacific Railway Co. (1894,
C. C. D. Neb.) 64 Fel x65, Justice Brewer said on pp. 176-177 that if property
invested in railroads is "taken for public uses, its value must be paid for . . .
The same general ideas must enter into and control legislation of the kind
before us. The value of the property cannot be destroyed by legislation depriv-
ing the owner of adequate compensation. The power which the legislature has
is only to 'prescribe reasonable rates, not any rates . . . But the foundation
of the idea of reasonableness is justice . . . There can' be no justice in that
which works to such investors a practical destruction of their property thus
invested . . . The protection of property implies the protection of its
value . . "
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therefor. It is .perhaps because of .the obviousness of these facts
that the "market value of the service" has never been applied seriously
by the Supreme Court as a test.7
The other test, however, is what has caused the trouble. "The
"protection of property," said Justice Brewer, sitting as a Circuit Judge
in Ames v. Union Pacific Railway Co.,s "implies the protection of its
"value" against destruction-presumably against partial as 'well as
against complete destruction.
"If the public were seeking to take title to the railroad by condemnation,
the present value of the property, and not the cost, is that which. [it]
would have to pay. In like manner, if may be argued that, when the
legislature assumes the right to reduce, the rates so -educed cannot
be adjudged unreasonable if, under them, there is earned by the railroad
company a fair interest on the actual value of the property."
Reduction of rates, in other words, if unrestricted, might operate to
impair the pre-existing value of the property-the value which it
actually had as a business concern, the value for which compensation
would be rendered in a condemnation case.9  This impairment must
be prevented. It can be prevented by requiring the legislature, when
it reduces rates, to reduce them only to the point where the company
may still earn "a fair interest on the actual value of the property."
Such is the raison d'etre of the theory that rates should be based on
"value"; if they were to be made to yield less than a "fair interest" on
the pre-existing "value," that value would be partially destroyed.
While the company earns a "fair interest," its property maintains
-its present value; but should it be compelled to earn less, the value of
its property will shrink. If this is true, it must be that the value upon
which a return must be permitted is something.which depends upon
the earnings, or upon some part of them at least, for its continued exist-
ence. Moreover, it is a fact well recognized in business that the value
of a property .as a going concern-and that. is the value for which
compensation would be rendered in condemnation proceedings-will
rise or fall with every prospective rise or fall in the net earnings. It
follows that its present "value," in the sense used by Justice Brewer,
will persist only as long as its present prospective earning power
remains unimpaired. Since the "fair interest on the actual value" means
the amount which must be earned if the present value is to persist, this
"fair interest on the actual value" turns out to be no other than the
earnings which the company is already anticipating.
What, then, becomes of the power to regulate, if the legislature may
not reduce rates to the point where they yield less than they already
'It does not follow, however, that cost plus a fair return is the only test for
individual rates. "Value of service,", in the loose sense of "considerations of
policy other than cost," may be considered, provided it is clear that the -term is
not used in the sense of market value. Cf. a suggestive article by Henry White
Edgerton, entitled Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate Making (I9i9)
32 HARv. L. REv. 516. 'Supra, note 6.
'Monongahela Nav. Co. v United States I893) 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622.
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yield? It is true that cases sometimes arise where a reduction of
rates, because of additional traffic, will not be followed by a rlduction
of the net earnings. But Justice Brewer did not mean to confine the
power to reduce to cases such as these. Had he so intended, his
inquiry in this case would have ended when he found, as he did find,
that the statute'would have the effect of reducing net earnings. But
he did not stop the inquiry there. He thought it necessary, before
holding the statute unconstitutional, to estimate the "value" in.dollars
and cents. It is clear that he was unaware that the logical implication
of his doctrine would preclude any reduction of net earnings whatso-
ever, regardless of how great the value might be found to be.
REPRODUCTION COST AS A CONCEALMENT OF THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
Justice Brewer's decision reached the Supreme Court for review
under the name Smyth v'. Ames.'0 It was affirmed in 1898 in a much
quoted opinion rendered by Justice Harlan for a unanimous bench,
of which Justice Brewer was himself a member. This famous opinion
does not repeat in so many words Justice Brewer's statement that
the function of the courts in rate cases is to protect the same value for
which compensation would be rendered in eminent domain. It does,
however, contain the following dictum :
"The basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates
must be the fair value of the property being used . . . for the con-
venience of the public. And, in order to ascertain that value, the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates pre-
scribed by'statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses,
are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as
may be just and right in each case. We do not say that there may not
be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.
What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of
that which it employs for the public convenience. On the other hand,
what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from
it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are
reasonably worth."'1
Here we have an early sanction for "considering," among other
things, the replacement cost-or, as the court phrases it, "the present
"as compared with the original cost of construction." What was the
court's reason? It is submitted that the whole court was laboring
under'thQ same delusion as that which accounts for the reasoning of
Justice Brewer in the court below-the delusion that the power to
reduce earnings might co-exist with a duty to allow the company a-
fair return on the value of its property as a going concern. Attempts
have been made to acquit the'court of logical inconsistency by holding
1 (I898) I69 U. S. 466, I8 Sup. Ct. 418.
169 U. S. 546-547, I8 Sup. Ct. 434.
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that "the value of that which it employs for the public convenience"
does not mean value-in-exchange at all- 2 or that it means value in some
"socialistic" sense equivalent to cost,13 or that it means the value-in-
exchange of the physical as distinct from the "intangible" property.,'
I have myself contended that the last interpretation is possible and is
susceptible of being reconciled with most of the court's words and
acts,"- a contention the fallacy of which, as applied to monopolies, has
been asserted since I wrote, and asserted, it seems to me, with
convincing proof."' But my interpretation, like the others mentioned,
is based-on the assumption that in future the court will try to adopt
some theory to reconcile all previous statements. If there be some
theory which will do that, the court may prefer it. But for an histor-
ical explanation of what really influenced the court we are not obliged
to rule out the hypothesis of inconsistency. There is no good histor-
ical or psychological reason to suppose either that Justice Harlan
perceived the logical fallacy underlying Justice Brewer's reasoning, or
that the latter, when he concurred with Justice Harlan's opinion, had
become aware of his own previous error.
But if the court was seeking. to base earnings on the value as a
going concern, and it that value consists of a capitalization of earnings,
why did the court, require a "consideration" of elements totally
distinct from a capitalization of earnings? What have original cost,
and replacement cost, to do with earnings?
The answer is not far to seek. If one were buying a factory oper-
ating under competitive conditions, there is no doubt that its value is
a capitalization of the prospective earnings. Yet there is also no
doubt that the "buyer and seller would "consider" the replacement
cost. Why? Because the earnings are not predictable with certainty.
They may be reduced by subsequent competition. "Yet there is some
reason to suppose that new competitors will keep out unless they expect
to be able to earn as much as a fair return on the cost of building a
factory as efficient as the one in question. The buyer may feel surer
of the continuance of that part of the earnings which constitutes a fair
1Stevens, Chairman, in Fuhrmann v. Cataract Power & Cbnduit Co. (913,
2d dist. N. Y.) 3 P. S. C. 656, 681"
"Harleigh H. Hartman, Fair Value (I920) 62-63. But then why "consider"
the market value of the'stocks and bonds, and the replacement cost?
"The words have meant all thiigs to all men. To many commissions and
courts they mean that the basis is value as a going concern. To Hartman they
prove that the court meant actual cost. To Stevens, as Public Service Com-
missioner, they prove, as already noted, that the court could not have meant
exchange value. To the same Stevens, as counsel for the NTew York Central
Railroad, they prove that it could not have meant anything else. See pamphlet,
The Valuation of Railroad Right of Way, No. 3 (1914).
2" Hale, Valuation and Rate Making: The Conflicting Theories of the Wiscon-
sin, Railroad Commission, z9o5-x97 (8o Columbia University Studies in History,
Economics, and Public Law, No. x). ch. i. On p. 28 I stated that, "unless the
Court was hopelessly confused, the 'fair value' is not the market- value of the
entire property." That statement still seems to me to be true. The court was
confused. " See infra, p. 718.
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return 6n the replacement cost than of earnings beyond this. If
earnings beyond are assured by some specific circumstances the contin-
uance of which can be fairly relied upon, the value of the factory may
include an "intangible" element of good will or the like, over and above
its replacement cost. If, however, there is. nothing to prevent the
buyer of the plant from .putting up and operating his own factory,
without buying this one, then of course he would pay no more than the
replacement cost for this one; whatever earnings might be thought at
first to give it a value above this are not likely to persist in the face of
exposure to competition, and are not likely to enter into the capitaliza-
tion. Replacement cost is thus a highly important bit of evidence
bearing on the earning capacity of a plant subject to competition.
But what bearing on earning, capacity have the other matters enumer-
ated by the court? Replacement cost cannot always be estimated
easily or cheaply, and the original cost plus the cost of the permanent
improvements, if recorded on the books, may be "considered" as evi-
dence of replacement cost. If not recorded on the books, the amount
(par value) of the stocks and bonds may give some evidence of the
original cost, hence of replacement cost, hence of future earning capa-
city, hence of value. The market value of the securities is the exchange
value of the plant, -when the exchange takes place in fractional shares.
"The probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates
"prescribed .by statute, and the sum required to meet operating
"expenses" were undoubtedly meant by .the court to bear on the-inquiry
into what the earnings would amount to under the prescribed rates-not
to be relevant -to the value upon which those earnings, to be valid,
must constitute a fair return.
Each of the matters enumerated by Justice Harlan, then, would be,
and in fact is, "given consideration" in estimates of the value of
competitive plants. Yet that value deiends on the earnings. The
replacement cost is significant only as bearing on the probability of the
earnings continuing unimpaired. In monopolistic properties, replace-
ment cost has no such bearing. As evidence of the value of the property
as a going concern, it -is inferior'to a capitalization of the prospective
earnings. Yet that very inferiority of replacement cost as evidence
has served to postpone the out-and-out rejection of Justice Brewer's
rule. Had the court estimated the value in each case by the more
reliable method of capitalizing earnings, the conclusion would be
reached invariably that the earnings expected under the existing rates
constituted a fair percentage and no more, on. those. same earnings
capitalized at that percentage. 17 The court might then have begun to
suspect tlat the value rule and the power to reduce earnings could -not
17The sole logical escape from this vicious circle is one which is too absurd
for serious consideration. If the earnings are capitalized at one rate, and the
"fair return" is defined as a lower rate, then the earnings will always be found
to exceed a fair return on the value and to be susceptible of a certain reduction.
After the reduction the value will have shrunk as well, and the reduced earnings
will again exceed a fair return on the reduced value. By this internretation of
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co-exist. As it is; however, by adopting a less acctirate measure of.
value, there have been cases where a reduction of net earnings has been
found to permit of the continued earning of a fair return on the value
as found."' The result is an apparent reconciliation between the value
rule and the power to reduce. The reconciliation is of course no more
than apparent, for the value does not in fact cease to equal a capitaliza-
tion of the earnings merely because an erroneous measure has been
applied to it. -The circumference of a circle remains 3.1416 times the
diameter, even though it -was measured with a tape which has been
stretched, Yet there are authorities who admit that the value depends
upon the earnings, but insist that the -vicious circle involved- (in bising
the earnings on the value) can be escaped merely by the simple expe-
dient of measuring the value by replacement cost or some other
"evidence' !' Like ostriches, they imagine that by blinking the fact
they can escape its consequences..
At the time of Smyth v. Ames, the Supreme Court' itself, as we have
seen, ignored the dependence of the value on the fates. Since then,
occasionally, the connection has been perceived. In Willcox v. Consol-
the formula, the earnings can be successively reduced with a constant approach
to' zero. The formula would therefore offer no protection whatever to the
owners. Cf. Valuation and Rate Making, pp. 2o-21.
' Reductions were held valid in San Diego Land & Toui Co. v. National City
(1899) 174 U. S. 739, ig Sup. Ct. 804; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper
(1903) "i89 U. S. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. 57I; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin &c. Co.
(I9o4) 192 U. S. 2o1, 24 Sup. Ct. 241; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (19o9)
212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1gog) 212 U. S. 19,
29 Sup. Ct. xg2; Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids (1912) 223 U. S. 655,
32 Sup. Ct. 389; Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729; and
Des Moines Gas Co. v. -Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811.
'Note the following language of Samuel 0. Dunn, the editor of the Railway
Age, in an article entitled The Valuation of Railways (Mar. 1914) 113 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, 403 :
"The reasoning and language of the federal courts indicate that to them
'fair value' means substantially the same thing in a rate as in a condemnation
case
"However, there is one important difference between making a valuation-of
property preliminary to dispossessing its owner and giving him its equivalent
ift cash, and making a valuation for fixing reasonable rates. The market'value
of a property depends on. its earning capacity; and when property is taken under
the power of eminent domain it is approached from a commercial standpoint.
Therefore, the chief consideration is earning capacity, and ordinarily the chief
measure of earning capacity is the amount of profit actually earned. In valu-
ation for the regulation of rates, on the other hand, the fundamental assumption
is that the chief measure of the reasonableness of the rates is the ratio of the
net earnings to the value of the property; and the immediate purpose of the
valuation is 'to ascertain this ratio. Obviously, in such valtiation little or no
weight can be given t6 the net earnings." (pp. 408-4o9.)
That is, the same market value, which "depends" on net earnings, is to be
taken in rate cases, but the fact that it depends on net earnings is to be forgotten
by the choice of some-other evidence as to its amount.
The same attempt to escape the vicious circle by adopting a rule of evidence
which conceals the circle, is to be found in the opinion of Judge Miller in
People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Co. v. Willcox (1914) 21o N. Y. 479, 1O4
N. E. g1. He concurred with the Appellate Division in its holding that there
is "no logical difference between allowing 'going value' in the valuation of a
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idated Gas Co., 20 the company's claim that the franchises had increased
in value was rejected, on the ground that this alleged value depended
upon earnings, and that the earnings could not be anticipated, since the
state had the power to reduce them. The rule that the company may
not expect to be protected in the enjoyment of a fair return on the
increased value of the franchises was deduced by the court from the
premise that the company may not expect to be protected in the enjoy-
ment of a fair return on the increased value of the franchises. By
such similar reasoning the court was saved the necessity of rejecting
the value rule altogether. In Cedar Rapids.Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids,
21
the Minnesota Rate Cases25 and Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines3
the court perceived that certain claims madeby the companies would
amount to a capitalization of the earnings, and it therefore rejected
those claims. It did not, however, make a clear-cut repudiation of the
value rule. In Denver v. Denver Union Water Co.,24 while Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke were dissenting on another point,
Justice Pitney put the court definitely back into the ostrich-position,
ignored the dependence of value on rates, and insisted, -apparently, on
the inclusion of the entire value as a going concern.
How long the Supreme Court's learned head will remain in the sand
cannot, of course, be predicted. As long as it does remain there,
however, reproduction cost less depreciation will be held to be a proper
matter for "consideration," and 'we may expect an increase in the brood
of vague "composite.value" cases in the lower courts and commissions.
2 5
The -results will be a failure to give the regulatory experiment a fair
trial as a substitute for government oivnership and operation.
plant when it is to be taken entirely by the public and allowing the same element
when valuing the same plant for rate making purposes." He then adds (2io
N. Y. 486, 104 N. E. 912) :
"It is no answer to say that in condemnation cases the exchange value is
taken, and that that depends on the rates charged, the .thing to be determined in
rate cases. Of course, a rule of valuation might be adopted in a condemnation
case which would not work.in a rate case; but if the cost of reproduction, less
depreciation, rule be adopted, as appears to have been done in National Water-
works Company v. Kansas City (62 Fed. Rep. 583) and City of Omaha v. Omaha
Water Company (218 U. S. i8o), the leading condemnation cases in the federal
courts in which 'going value' was considered, it is impossible to see why the
'going value' could not be determined in both classes -of cases in precisely the
same way."
He seems to think that cost of reproduction less depreciation was used in the
two condemnation cases he cites for some purpose other than to ascertain the
exchange value. Further in the opinion he says that "exchange value" "is not
admissible in a rate case" and later "We are dealing, not with exchange values,
but with tile value upon which the company is entitled to earn a return."
"Supra note 18.
= 223 U. S. 669,.32 Sup. Ct. 390.
22 230 U. S. 455, 33 Sup. Cat. 762;
'238 U. S. 17E, 35 Sup. Ct. 817.
21 (i918).246 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 278.
"Some of the Wisconsin commission cases applying this hybrid method. of
"valuation" are described and discussed in Valuation and Rate Making, ch. 4.
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"PHYSICAL" VS. "INTANGIBLE" VALUE-A DISTINCTION SUPPOSED TO
AVOID THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
Meanwhile many lower bodies have attempted to escape the vicious
circle by confining the requisite fair return to the value of the physical
property is distinct from that of the entire business. Elsewhere I
have attempted toshow that such a distinction can be made, and that
the exchange value of the physical property is equal either to the cost
of replacing it with an equally efficient substitute, or to the value of the
entire business as an earning proposition, according to which of the two
is the lower.28 Mr. Gerard C. Henderson has objected that, while it
is true that a hypothetical buyer already possessed of a franchise would
pay no more than the replacement cost or the earning capacity value
(whichever is lower), still it is not necessarily true that he would pay
as much as this. Since the seller (who has no franchise) would be
glad to get anything above junk value, and since we may not assume
competition among franchise-owners for the purchase of the plant,
the plant would exchange .for a price anywhere between' junk value
and replacement cost (or earning capacity value). 27 In other words,
there is no determinate sum for which the plant would exchange,
unless we suppose it to be sold by one operator to another, in which
case the exchange value will be our old friend, the earning capacity
value. This criticism seemed to me at first to ignore another possible
hypothesis under which the sale could be supposed to take place-
namely, a sale between persons who will still have to construct the
.plant and the owner of a franchise. The sellers would not construct
it without receiving the replacement, cost, which would then constitute
the minimum as well as the maximum selling price-a determinate
value. Upon further reflection, however, I am inclined to thifik that
any such "long-run" hypothesis, however useful it may be as an explan-
ation of a standard to which the value may tend to conform, is not
admissible as a hypothesis upon which the "exchange value" of property
already in being can be predicated.
"PHYSICAL VALUE" RULE AS A PROTECTION OF "VESTED RIGHTS"
Let us suppose, however, that the distinction possesses validity.
Would it not justify the use of replacement cost less depx'eciation28
as a rate base? Technically, yes, but only where reductions of earnings
are concerned-not where a commission is determining how-much of an
"Cf. Valuation and Rate Making, ch. I, sec., 5, PP. 29, 30.
"In the second of the two articles referred to supra note 4. . The criticism of
my position is to be found at 33 Hmtv. L. REv. i948-io5o.
Were depreciation not deducted, we should have the cost not of an equally
efficient but of a superior substitute. Valuation and Rate Making, pp. 37-38 and
67-71.
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increase to allow.2 9  Even in reduction cases, the rule carries out at
best but the letter, not the spirit, of the reasons which gave it birth.
The purpose of adopting a "value" rule at all was, as Justice Brewer
dearly explained, to afford to the owners the same protection they
would have received against the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. That purpose, however, can be effectuated only by annulling
the power to reduce net earnings. To leave all the value in excess
of the "1hysical" value exposed to the power of reduction is to fail
to carry out the original purpose of the rule.
t may be thought, however, that while the physical value rule fails
to accord complete protection to the owners, it is nevertheless. a useful
compromise shielding them from such drastic regulation as might be
practiced were rates to be reduced, say, to a fair return on the actual,
rather than the reproduction, cost. But why make this particular
compromise? It is submitted that a far better, more efficacious, less
capricious and less intricate compromise can be adopted. Suppose,
for instance, that two widows (or orphans, or savings bantks, or what-
ever it is that most appeals to the judicial heart) buy shares of equal
market value in two public service companies, regarded as equally
safe investments. Suppose that if unregulated each company would
continue to earn what it now gets, and that the stocks in the two
companies would therefore continue to have the same market value.
The one is a gas company owning iron mains, the replacement cost
of which, due to an advance in the price of iron, has increased to the
point where it equals or exceeds the market value of the stocks. The
other is a telephone company possessed of much copper wire, whose
replacement cost has fallen, due to a drop in the price of copper.
Under the replacement cost rule, the widow who bought the gas stock
would be given complete protection, the widow who bought the tele-
phone stock would not. Yet both bought with an eye solely to the
earnings, and the investor in gas paid not one cent more by reason of
the subsequent rise in iron prices. There would be no more hardship
in reducing her stock's value than in reducing that of the telephone
investor. As a rule for avoiding hardship, the replacement cost rule
is about as capricious as any that could be devised. If a compromise
is sought which will afford some protection to investments made before
the regulation, 0 but not sufficient protection to defeat the power to
' Valuation and Rate Making, ch. I, sec. II, pp. 38-40. Mr. Henderson takes
issue with this part of my argument too. 33 HARV. L. REv. I050. If the market
anticipates that the court will allow a fair return on an increased reproduction
cost, though the legislature has kept the earnings below this and announced
that they would continue to be kept below, and if the market anticipates the
court's action with sufficient confidence, then it is true that the property will
possess an exchange value equal to the reproduction cost. But so much of the
value as results from a prognostication of a particular decision will not, I
imagine, be protected, even in eminent domain proceedings, so far as to deflect
the decision from the course it would otherwise have taken. However, I am not
familiar with the law on the subject.
"Cf. Valuation and Rate Making, ch. 7.
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reduce, it would appear to be simpler and far more satisfactory to
protect a given percentage of all investments, -rather than so much as
happens -to coincide with replacement cost. The physical value distinc-
tion provides a counterfeit substitute for the valuation rule first adopted
by the Supreme Court. It follows the letter but not the spirit of that
rule. Since the spirit is inconsistent with the well-settled power to
reduce earnings, the rule itself must go. There is no merit in the
counterfeit.
REPLACEMENT COST AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST EXTRAVAGANCE
In spite of thie eminent domain theory which influenced Jttstice
Brewer, the doctrine of actual cost kept'recurring in argument, and
occasionally in judicial decision. Before Smyth v. Ames was decided,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the test of actual cost, on
the theory that a fair return on that amount is one of the necessary
expenses of rendering the service.3' The language of Smyth v. Ames,
taken apart from its historical context, would seem.to give as much
sanction to original cost plus the cost of permanent improvements as
it gives to replacement cost. In three subsequent cases, however, the
Supreme Court rejected' the company's claim to a fair return on the
actual cost.3 2 That claim is of course inconsistent with the eminent
domain theory, but the court was not content to reject it on that ground
alone. In each of the 'three cases the court criticised the actual cost
rule as- a question of policy, on the ground that it might have been
dishonestly or extravagantly incurred. That is undoubtedly a valid
criticism of an unmodified actual cost rule; it is not an argument for
any basis other than actual cost if modified to make allowance for
unreasonable expenditures. Yet the court thi.nks it an argument for
"present value," which is generally interpreted as replacement cost
less depreciation, with or without the addition of "intangibles," and
always as an .amount which includes the "unearned increment" of
land.3  The idea is expressed succinctly by Justice Hughes in the
Minnesota Rate Cases,3 ''as follows:
"It is'clear that in ascertaining the present value we are not limited to
the consideration of the amount of the ,actual investment. If that. has
81Brymer v. Butler Water Co. (1897) 179 Pa. 231, 36 Atl. 249.
'San Diego'Land & Tom; Co. v. National City, supra note I8, Sat Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, ibid., and Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin &c.
Co., ibid.
' The Supreme Court has not held rigidly that "present value" is always
synonymous with reproduction cost less depreciation. In the Minnesota Rate
Cases, for instance, it pointed out that what the market value of the land, and
cohsequently the cost of acquiring the roadbed, would be, on the hypothesis
that the railroad had not been built, could not possibly be told. It therefore
rejected the cost of reproduction as a means of "ascertaining" the "value" of
the roadbed. While it allowed a "value" equal to the value of the adjacent
lands, it did not make this allowance, apparently, on the ground that it repre-
sents replacement cost, but because it would permit the company to share in
the general prosperity of the community. Again, in Des Moines Gas Co. v.
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been reckless or improvident, losses may be sustained which the
community does not underwrite. As the company may not be protected
in its actual invbstment, if the value of its property be plainly less,
so the making of a just return for the use of the property involves the
recognition of its fair value if it be more than its cost."
But unless the '"fair value" or "value," as Justice Hughes uses the
term, means "the amount which would have -been. spent by ordinary
"reasonable men"--and he evidently means it in no such sense-the
learned Justice might have said with equal truth, "Whether the actual
"investment was reckless and improvident or not, losses may be
"sustained which the community does not underwrite if the value of the
"property, with or without the company's fault, :is less than the actual
"investment." As the Railroad Commission of- Wisconsin has pointed
out, a company may build a plant at a high cost, not because the com-
pany is reckless or improvident, but because it is impossible to build
at the time for less. "Under such conditions," says the commission,
"it might not always be fair or equitable for the municipality, later on
when the situation has improved, to take any undue advantage of those
who in good faith undertook to furnish -a service that was almost
indispensable, and that at the time could be had on no better terms. '"3 5
The "present value" rule, in other words, is not necessarily a correc-
tive at all for recklessness and improvidence in the making of the actual
inVestment. This rule may happen to give a return on something far
in excess of the most reckless amount that could well have-been spent,
or it may give a return on an amount much below the sum which the
very shrewdest business .man would have spent at the time when the
plant had to be built. Whatever else can be said for "present value,"
it is frivolous to defend it as a protection against the recklessness and
extravagance of the original investors.
REPLACEMENT COST AS THE BEST EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL COST
"The general use of the cost of reproduction as an indication of
"investment in a physical plant has been largely necessitated "' says the
Wisconsin Railroad Commission, "by the lack of accurate and reliable
"inforination as to actual, legitimate investment."3 6 And the Supreme
Court of the same state, speaking through Judge "Barnes, who had been
the first chairman of the* Railroad Commission, said two years later:
"It was shown in the testimony that, while the ascertainment of cost
was desirable, it is not a safe guide to tie to and is not
considered especially important in arriving at final results. At least
no such importance is attached to it as is to reproduction cost. This
Des Moines, infra note 49, the court refused to allow the full replacement cost,.
when that would include the cost of cutting through pavement which had been
laid at the city's expense over the mains.
34 0913) 230 U. S. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 762.
'Hill v. Antigo Water Co. (909) 3 Wis. R. C. R. 623, 633-634.
"Green Bay v. Green Bay Water Co. (913) I Wis. R. C. R. 236, 245.
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is due to the fact that it is very difficult in most cases to arrive at cost
where a plant has been constructed for a long time, and it is also
difficult to ascertain whether the cost-has been kept within reasonable
bounds."37
Of course where actual cost cannot be ascertained with reasonable
accuracy it cannot be used. There is no escape from that fact. But
utilities which have been built since the era of serious regulation set in,
are not in that class. Their costs are recorded with the appropriate
commission.
'Utilities which have been built so far in the past that there is no
record of their actual cost must perforce be regulated on some other
basis, and if actual cost were thought a desirable basis, reproduction
cost might be the best available substitute. But if reproduction cost
is used simply as evidence of actual cost, it must be modified to allqw
for all conditions which are known to cause it to exceed or fall short
of the actual. In these ancient concerns, however, it seems to me very
doubtful whether we wish to base the return on an approximation to the
actual cost incurred by the company. The shares have frequently
changed hands since the original construction took place, and whatever
amount was original1y spent for construction was not spent by the
present owners, who are, the ones to be affected by regulation. Had
it always been known that rates were to be reduced to a fair return on
the actual cost, the stockholders being credited with the intermediate
.deficits and debited with the intermediate surpluses, then of course no
one would have paid more than that actual cost for his stock. What
the present owners paid for their stock would in that case coincide with
what the plant had actually cost. But such is far from being the situa-
tion. With these old companies, then, it seems better to ignore both
the actual and the replacement cost, and to allow a return which will
afford a partial, but not a complete, protection to existing values.
Such a policy, coupled with a future announced policy of actual cost,
modified in such respects as the promotion of efficiency may require, and
with a drastic inheritance tax, would not be so unduly tender to the
existing owners as to constitute them a permanent drag on the
community.
In all cases, then, where actual cost is not ascertainable, it seems to
me unnecessary to adopt reproduction cost or anything else as evidence
of that actual cost.
REPLACEMENT COST AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST CHANGES IN THE VALUE OF
MONEY
Judge Learned Hand of the federal District Court has recently
defended the replacement cost theory on a novel ground.38 If the
"Duluth St. Ry. v. Railroad Commission (1915) i61 Wis. 245, 273, 152 N. W.
887, 897.
" Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton (i92o, S. D. N. Y.) 267 Fed. 231, 237.
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company, he contends, gets a fair return'only on the amount of money
which it actually invested, and if meantime the buying power of the
dollar has decreased, the company is in fact getting less than a fair
return (measured in buying power) on that which it originally invested
(measured again 'in buying power). This is undoubtedly true. But
the judge draws the curious inference that a fair return on the present
buying power of the money -actually invested is equivalent to a fair
return on the replacement cost. The inference would be correct if the
difference between the replacement and the actual cost could be
explained wholly by the change in the value of the dollar. That is far
from the case.39 Much can be said for and against the policy of
protecting investors against changes in the value of the dollar. But
that policy is not furthered by adopting the replacement cost as the
rate base.40
REPLACEMENT COST AS A MEASURE OF EQUAL TREATMENT OF REGULATED
AND UNREGULATED PROPERTY OWNERS
Property increments under regulation are sometimes defended oi
the ground that everyone in an unregulated business may get thexm
In the Minizesota Rate Cases4" Justice Hughes, purely by way of dictum,
"valued" the roadbeds at the market value of adjacent lands. This
was not in the belief that the company would have had to pay that
much were it to reproduce the property-the replacement cost in this
instance was expressly ruled out as impossible of estiniation, since
what the railroad would have to pay for its lands if there were no
railroad there would be purely a matter of speculation. In allowing
the market value of adjacent lands, the court may have been influenced'
in part by an erroneous notion that the roadbed has a value equal to
that of adjacent lands, but it was influenced chiefly, it seems, by the
theory- that the railroad ought to be allowed "a reasonable share in the
"general prosperity of the communities which it serves." The owners
of adjacent lands have shared in that prosperity to the extent that their
lands have appreciited in value; hence the appreciation in the adjacent
lands measures the amount by which the railroads should share in 'the
general prosperity. To allow them less than a fair return on this
increased amount, would be to treat them less favorably than the rest
of the community.
It is submitted that this line of argument is fallacious. It is quite
true that the unregulated owners of land derive from the prosperity
For a tingle illustration, see a very informing study by Robert Murray Haig
of The Unearned Increment in Gary (19W7) 32 Por. Sm QuAp. 86, wherein it
appears that, out of a total net increment between x9o6 and x915 of $2I,8O5,732.30
(making allowance for development expenses etc.), only $874,698 was due to
the depreciation in the value of money.
" I have commented more in detail on judge Hand's decision in a note in
(1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 166.
230 U. S. 455, 33 Sup. Ct. 762.
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of the community a benefit which can be measured by the increase in
their land values. But the owners of land, or of other property
susceptible of appreciation in value, constitute only a fraction of the
whole community. The gains which the rest of the population derive
from prosperity are of a vaguer, more intangible nature. These
vaguer gains the land owners share in, too, in addition to their incre-
ments. Now the land increment is the result of earnings derived from
the consumers of. the products of the land. Whether these earnings
are justified in the case of private owners is a question with which we
are not concerned. Arguments can be made -in support of .them, based
on the difficulty of distinguishing "earned" from "unearned" incre-
ments, the speculative incentives to production offered by the prospect
of increments, the unwieldy bureaucratic mechanism that would be
involved in any attempt to take' them away, and the like. The fact
remains that these increments result from net earnings in excess of a
fair return on the original price paid for the land. Such increments
come only to owners. If it be said that everyone has an equal oppor-
tunity to become an owner, the obvious answer is that one can become
an owner only on payment of the present, not the original, value; and
the increment has accrued-only to those who bought at less than the
present value. The increment accruing to landowners, then, is some-
thing not shared in equally by the whole community. Nor is it
shared equally by all 1ndowners, since some acquire great and some
small increments. Nor do all owners of lands adjacent to the railroad
roadbed share equally, since they may have bought at different prices.
How then can the owners of the roadbed be put on an equality with
the owners of the adjacent lands? The beneficial owners of the road-
bed (the.stockholders) cannot even be put on an equality with one
another in the enjoyment of increments, since, if there has been an*
increment, they have presumably bought their respective shares at
different prices. And the nominal owner, the company; cannot be
put on an equality with all the adjacent owners; since they are them-
selves unequal. To allow the railroad to earn a fair return on a
roadbed valued at the level of adjacent land values is to give it a
share in the prosperity of the community proportional (per unit of
land) to that enjoyed by some of the adjacent owners, but entirely out
of proportion to that of the rest of the community-and at the expense
of the rest of the community.
If the railroad is to be put on an equality with the most fortunate
of the unregulated propeity owners, all regulation, prospective as well
as retroactive, will be annulled. The owner of. unregulated property,
gets a value based on earnings not regulated by law. True, they are
frequently regulated by competition, but by no means invariably.
"Good will" and quasi-monopolistic "intangibles" are frequent assets of
unregulated concerns. To allow them to the owners of regulated
property for that reason, is to defeat all power to regulate.
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"When people obey other people's orders," said Dick Deadeye,
"equality's out of the question." The same is true when some men
get "intangible" values, some get large increments, some small, incre-
ments, and some no increments at all. To wipe o.ut these inequalities
is probably undesirable. The most we can do is to consider each case
of special advantage on its merits, without regard to the fact that
someone else also.has a special advantage, and that still someone else
has none at all. Since equality among all is out of the question, there
is.no force in the contentiori that the utility must be given an increment
in value for the purpose of giving it the same share in the community's
prosperity that other men enjoy.
REPLACEMENT COST AS A MEANS TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF CAPITAL TO
UNREGULATED FIELDS
It is frequently urged that unless an increment is allowed in utility
investments, capital will shun the utility field and be diverted to fields
where an increment is permitted. In thIs argument, too, it' is submitted,
there is a fallacy. If an increment is likely to be realized, say in the
real esta.te business, that increment will either be open to all comers,
or it will be confined to the owners of" certain kinds of property. In
the former case, capital will flow in, causing an increase in the supply
of houses, and an increased demand for the land, labor; etc. involved
in the construction of houses; there will follow a diminution in rents
and, very likely, an increase in costs. The prospective net earnings-
in the business will thus be curtailed, and the process will continue
until the increment vanishes. If-, as is more likely, the increment is
conditional on the ownership of limited resources (say land), the
present owners will not part with their advantages except on full
payment therefor. The outside investor will have to pay for his land
a price high enough to -offset any advantage he may reasonably expedt
to get. from the increment, and it is of course the increment which he
expects, not some unlooked for increment which may chance to accrue,
which would attract his capital away from the utility investment. The
terms to the outside investor, then, in an investment where an increment
is to be expected are no more advantageous than those in an investment
where it is not to be expected.
42
If it is said that the inside investor-the owner of the land-will
not devote it to utility purposes unless he gets a price high enough to
offset his prospective increment in other uses, that is perfectly true.
The selling price of land always reflects the seller's loss of a prospec-
tive increment. But this does not necessitate the allowance of an
increment to the utility company. The price which the utility actually
The prospect of the increment in the unregulated investment may be paid
for not entirely by a higher selling price, but partly by an imnmediate prospect
of earnings lower than they would be were the increment not expected. A
higher rate of return in the utility business than the immediate rate expected
in the other might be required to compete with the increment in the other. Cf.
what is said below, under the next heading.
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pays for its land is doubtless higher than it would be in the absence of
the prospect of a private increment. But this higher selling price is
part of the actual cost to the company which buys the land. If the
company may offer a fair xeturn on this amount to its stockholders,
they can be induced to subscribe this amount, since by definition a fair
return is a rate required to attract capital. The land owner will bepaid for his loss of increment, but the buyers of the stock have notbeen called upon to part with any increment, and therefore require no
increment to induce them to invest. 1
REPLACEMENT COST AS A SPECULATIVE OFFSET FOR RISKS
There is one argument for allowing an increment to a utility which
seems to me to be perfectly sound. It does not, however, necessitate
" Professor Harry Gunnison Brown argues not only that land will not bedevoted to utility purposes if shorn of the prospect of an increment which is'open in other uses, but that it cannot be so devoted without social'loss. If thecommunity will pay more for the use of land for other uses than for railroads,it shows that the land is more needed for those other uses. TransportationRates and Their Regulation (I916) 23-24. This may be true, though I questionthe underlying assumption that what consumers will pay for various servicesindicates their relative desires for them, since the consumers of the various
services are not necessarily persons of similar incomes. But grant the assump-tion. Still, at the time 'when the owners decide whether to devote their landto railroading or to other uses, if the railroad promises to pay a- fair return onthe actual cost (to the railroad) of acquiring the land, it indicates the anticipa-tion at that time of as great a demand for transportation as for the competing
uses. If, after the land is devoted to the railroad use, the value of similar landfor other uses should rise, the public demand for transportation may or may
not have risen in proportion. If the traffic will bear rates yielding a fair
return on reproduction cost, the public wants the transportation as badly asthe other uses. Were the commission to reduce the rates, this fact would stillbe true, though the reduction might make it impossible to determine how longthe traffic would bear the higher rates. If the traffic will not bear the higher
rates, there is no remedy, 
-unless the road is abandoned; and while, on Mr. -Brown's theory, it was a misdirection of labor to build it, still it is likely' to be
too late td devote the land to other uses.Mr. Brown may mean, however, that at the lower rates there will be a greaterdemand for transportation'than at the higher rates, and more labor thereforedevoted to meeting the demand." But if the higher rate were allowed, this extralabor would be devoted simply to the production of the additional things whichthe stockholders would be in a position to consume.. If the increment weretaxed, as Mr. Brown suggests it might be, then the additional labor would bedevoted, not to the additional transportation, but to uses determined just asartificially by the government when it spends the revenue. The channels into
which this labor shall flow must be determined 
-artificially in any event.However, in arguing against basing the "fair return" on the replacement cost,I do not mean to prejudge the question whether the excess above the fair return
should be reduced by taxation rather than by rate making. It seems to me thatregulation of utilities will never be complete until the "valuation" is treated
as bearing primarily not on what the company ought to charge, but on what itought to keep. Policy could then determine whether the keeping of more
should be prevented by the one method or the other.
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an appraisal of the reproduction cost. The prospect of an increment
in value may induce the investment of capital at a lower rate of return
than that for which-it would be invested without this prospect." In
cases where the risk is peculiarly great at the outset, it may be that the
capital cannot be attracted at all unless the chance of an increment
is offered.45 In such cases an increment may be expedient. Some
gambling chance of gain may be required to offset the unavoidable
gambling chance of loss. It is a matter of no great moment upon what
contingency this chance for gain is based. We might say to prospec-
tive investors,
"If the company fails, you lose; if it succeeds, you get not only a fair
return on what you put in (which is what you would get in an invest-
ment that was safe from the start), but in addition an increment in
value; we will fix the upper limit which the value of your stock may
reach, and you may decide, in competition with other investors; how
much below that level you will pay for it."
That is, we can regulate the security issues, and state in advance how
high a dividend we will permit in case of success; the necessary capital
can then be attracted by selling as many of these securities as may be
necessary, at whatever prices they may bring. As the risk lessens,
the payment of the. specified dividends will result in an increment in
the value of the shares. This can be brought about, be it noted, without
any regard whatever to the changes in the hypothetical replacement
cost. The replacement cost rule, as a gambling device, introduces
more speculation than is necessary, and the enormous cost of making
the appraisal renders it a peculiarly expensive form of gambling appar-
atus.
ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH FAMILIAR FORMS OF INCREMENT FROM
UNFAMILIAR IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPLACEMENT COST RULE
Curiously enough, certain forms of increment which would result
from the unflinching application of the replacement rule are repugnant
to the same courts and commissions which defend the more familiar
manifestations of the same rule, such as land increments. 'To allow
a utility to earn a fair return on a land increment is of course to allow
a return on something for which it never paid. The same thing is
equally true in regard to unregulated property, but this way of stating
the fact seems to throw doubt on the propriety of the private incre-
ments. Because of a reluctance'to doubt the propriety of anything so
familiar, fantastic efforts are made to distinguish the increment of
land from other items which the court or commission rejects. "To
"include anything in the value upon which rates are based," said the
Wisconsin Railroad Commission on August 3, I9o9, "for which no
The interrelation of the questions of increment and rate of return is well
discussed by Henderson, in the articles already cited.
"'Cf. Valuation and Rate Making, ch. 5, sec. 4, pp. io3-ioq.
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"equivalent has been rendered, would apparently disturb the equitable
"relation that should be maintained between utilities and their custo-
"mers."46 Yet when it came to the application of this reasoning
scarcely six months later in a manner which would deprive the company
of the familiar "unearned increment," the same commission, with the
same personnel,4 7 could not "now see good reasons upon which to
"exclude these elements. ' 48 Its argument is worth exafnining. It
is set forth below, with my criticisms interjected in italics:
"That the law as well as our social system," said the Commission,
"recognizes such gains in practically all other undertakings, is evident
from the fact that rents and interest 'charges usually vary with the
natural increase in the value of the property they cover. [It would
be more accurc~te -to say that the increase in value results from the,
increase in the rents and interest charges. No doubt the law recog-
nizes such gains; so did it recognize monopoly profits in utilit.
companies before regulation changed the law.] As the cost of repro-
duction of a plant usually plays perhaps the most important part in de-
termining its value [the very question at issue if by "value is medant
the rate base-an irrelevant statement if by "value" is meant exchange
value], it is more than likely that the owners would have to bear losses
in case land and other property had depreciated instead of appreciated.
[The statement of course begs the question.] It would seem only just
that the rule should work both ways. Appreciations in value of the
kind in question are also of an essentially different nature from such
appreciations in value as those which by the respondent's testimony is
[sic] classed as going value. It is appreciation of a kiid that is gener-
ally acknowledged as rightfully belonging to the owners of the property
which has thus risen in value. It is based neither on unreasonable
rates, nor on assumed business conditions or similar facts of this nature.
It is simply due to general growth and development."
To say that the appreciation in the company's land is not the result
of unreasonable rates is to beg the question. The utility's land, insofar
as it cannot be sold, has no value distinct from that of the entire plant
of which it foims part, unless the distinction between "physical" and
"intangible" value is tenable. Even then, if the amount on which the
company is permitted a return is less than the replacement cost, no
part of the mass can have a separate value. In either case, then, the
entire property, or the 'land alone, will have an increment only in case
the company be permitted rates high enough to cause that increment
to emerge. The land cannot be said to have increased in value merely
because adjacent land has increased. When speaking with strict
accuracy, the thing that is exchanged, and that consequently possesses
exchange value, is not the land, but the right of ownership in the land.
The rights in the adjacent lands differ essentially from the rights which
",Hill. v. Antigo Water Co. supra note 35, at p. 729.
'
7 B. H. Meyer (now an Interstate Commerce Commissioner), Halford Erick-
son, and John H. Roemer.
"State Journal Printing Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co. (191o) 4 Wis.
R. C. P. 501, 579.
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the regulated company has in its land. One can appreciate without
the other following suit. The. company's increment depends -on its
earnings. Whether the rates which will yield sufficient earnings to
create an increment are "unreasonable," is the very point at issue.
The commission can scarcely be said to have made its distinction very
convincing.
The same tendency to ban a return on pnything for which the com-
pany did not pay, when not given a familiar label like "land increment,"
appears in several of the decisions dealing with paving over the mains.
It frequently happens that, after a company has laid its mains in a
dirt street, the city paves the street. In such cases, the cost of replacing
the mains, involving as it does the cutting through andrelaying of the
paving, is likely to be considerably in excess of the cost that actually
was incurred. There has been some conflict among the authorities
as to whether the company is to be entitled to a fair return on the
replacement cost. The United States Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals have both denied the company any such right,
but in language which is inconsistent with the attitude of both courts
on the question of the land increment.
In Des Mdines Gas Co. v. Des Moines,49 Justice Day followed the
master in chancery in- rejecting the claim, and said:
"The Master reached the conclusion that the life of the mains would
not be enhanced by the necessity of removing the pavements, and that
the Company had no right of property in the pavements thus-dealt with,
and that there was neither justice noi equity in requiring the people
who had been at the expense of paving the streets to pay -an additional
sum for gas because the plant, when 'put in, would have to be at the
expense of taking up and replacing the pavements in building the same.
He held that such added value was wholly theoretical, when no benefit
was derived therefrom. We find no error in this disposition of the
question."
The court's fundamental reason, it is plain, is the alleged injustice
in requiring those who paid for the paving to pay also an additional
price for gas merely because the paving happens to add to the replace-
ment cost. But the reason would be just as strong had the paving, or
any other municipal inprovement, increased land values, and thus added
to the cost of re-acquiring the land. The other arguments as well
which the master urged Would be equally applicable to land increments.
That the life of the mains would not be enhanced by the paving is no
more true than that the life of the land is not enhanced by the incredfient.
That the company has no right of property in the pavements has nothing
to do With whether it should be allowed an increment for its mains.
To say that the added value was theoretical, is to beg the question if
no distinction can be maintained between the physical and the intangible
property, for what the value shall be depends on what we decide as to
the paving. If the distinction can be maintained, however, the added
* (1915) 238 U. S. 172, 35 Sup. Ct. 817.
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physical value was real-the paving has increased the physical at the
expense of the intangible value.50
Let us turn to the more detailed argument in People ex rel. Kings
County Lighting Co. v. Willcox.5 As Judge Miller (the present
governor) attempts to distinguish the increment sought for the paving
from the ordinary "unearned increment," a detailed analysis of his
reasoning m'ay repay us. As before, I shall interject my own com-
ments and questions, in italics, into his statement. He says:
"But the new pavements in fact added nothing to the property of the
relator. Its mains were as serviceable and intrinsically as valuable
befo-e as after the new pavements were laid. [Was not land as service-
able before as after the increase in the cost of buying it? and intrinsi-
cally as valuable for every purpose except sale?] . . . The question has
a double aspect. What will be fair to the public as well as to the relator?
(Smyth v. Ames, supra). Should the public pay more for gas simply
because improved pavements have been laid at public expense? [or
because the price which the company never did and never will have to
spend, but only would have to spend were conditions other than they
are, has risen?] It is no answer to say that the new expensive pave-
ments suggest improved conditions which, though adding to the value
of the plant, will not, by reason of the greater consumption, add to the
expense per thousand feet of the gas consumed. The public are entitled
to the benefit of the improved conditions, if thereby the relator is enabled
to supply gas at a less rate.-2 The relator is entitled to a fair return
on its investment, not on improvements made at public expense. [If
"investment" means the amount actually invested, the argument would
exclude the land ioitrement. If "investment" means "the amount
"upon which a return should be allowed," the statement begs the ques-
tion.] It is said that the mains will have to be relaild. So will the new
pavements, and much oftener. Both might possibly be relaid at the same
time. [The argument which the judge meets here would apply more.
properly, to the allowance for depreciation than to the faii- return.]
The case is not at all parallel to the so-called unearned increment of
land. That the company owns. [The very question at issue when
one asks why land increment should be allowed. The -land has no
separate value apart from the entire plant, unless (a) the distinction
between physical and intangible value can be maintained, in which case
the company clearly owns a similar increment in the main, or unless(b) the company may sell the land, which is not probable, since it ii
not permissible to impair the efficiency- of the plant. If it could,
however, sell, the company is-pot being deprived of any sale-value by
being refused a fair return on the increment so long' as it remains
unsold.] It does not own the pavements [but the claim is for ,an
increased value in the mains; if the land value rose by reason of the
' Cf. Valuation and Rate Making, p. 30, note 2.
"(1914) 2io N. Y. 494-495, io4 N. E. 915.
'This seems to me to be an excellent answer to the suggestion made by
Commissioner Franklin K. Lane in Advances in Rates-Western Case (i91I)
20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 343-345, to the effect that while railroads ought not to be
allowed to increase their rates to allow them an unearned increment, they are
nevertheless entitled to whatever increment may result from the increasing
density of their traffic at the same rates.
THE "PHYSICAL VALUE" FALLACY
erection of -a city hall, would the judge deny the land increment on the
ground that the company did not own the city hall?], and the la3ing
of them does not add to its investment [neither does the land increment,
unless the word "investment" is used in a question-begging sense] oi
increase the cost to it of producing gas [does the land increment increase
the cost of producing the gas?] The cost of reproduction less accrued
depreciation rule seems to be the one generally employed in rate cases.
But it is merely a rule of convenience and must be applied with reason.
On the one hand it should not be so applied as to deprive the corporation
of a fair return at all times on the reasonable, proper and necessary
investment made by it to serve the public, and on the other hand it
should not be so applied as to give the corporation a return on improve-
ments made at public expenge which in no way increase the cost to
it of performing that service."
It is submitted that on judge Miller's reasoning there is no ground
for considering the replacement cost at all. The entire logic of his
position is to allow a return on "the reasonable, proper and necessary
"investment made by" the company.5 3 That is also the logic of Justice
Day's position. Judge Miller's decision in particular illustrates sharply
the plight of a mind which clearly favors the actual cost policy on its
merits, but which fears to apply it to so respectable an institution as
the "unearned increment." The mind which faces such a dilemma
seems pathetically eager to grasp at straw distinctions.
CONCLUSIONS'
Not one of the arguments enumerated -above-and they are all that
occur to me at this writing-necessitAtes the adoption of replacement
cost less depreciation (or "physical value"). There may be reason for
protecting existing owners from too drastic a reduction in their values,
there may be grounds for permitting whatever increments may be
required in order to offset risks or to compensate for a shrinkage in
the dollar. These may be valid grounds for making specific depar-
tures from the actual, reasonable cost rule, but not for adopting the
replacement cost. Judge Miller acted on a sounder instinct when he
refused to allow the company the benefit of the cost, which it never
had to incur, of relaying the mains, than when he attempted to reconcile
that refusal with the allowance of a cost, which never had to be
incurred, of acquiring land at an increased price. The replacement
rule serves neither the jurposes of policy nor those of the fallacious
value rule which it has supplanted. It is high time for the Supreme
Court to reconsider its position in the matter.
'The entire discussion of the other chief, point in this case-"going value"-
is a very able argument for iicluding the early .deficits which have in fact
been incurred and not repaid, on the ground that they constitute a cost. But
the judge admits land increment on the flimsy grounds shown in the text, and
he thinks his actual cost rule, and his rejection of exchange value, to be con-
sistent not, only with reproduction cost when modified, but also with eminent
domain value. See note 19, supra.
